Introduction
A number of models of general relativity seem to contain "holes" which are thought to be "physically unreasonable". One seeks a condition to rule out these models. We examine a number of possibilities already on the table. We then introduce a new condition: epistemic hole-freeness. Epistemic holefreeness is not just a new condition -it is new in kind. In particular, its motivation is primarily epistemic rather than metaphysical.
Preminilaries
We begin with a few preliminaries concerning the relevant background formalism of general relativity. 1 An n-dimensional, relativistic spacetime (for n ≥ 2) is a pair of mathematical objects (M, g ab ). M is a connected ndimensional manifold (without boundary) that is smooth (infinitely differentiable). Here, g ab is a smooth, non-degenerate, pseudo-Riemannian metric of Lorentz signature (+, −, ..., −) defined on M .
Note that M is assumed to be Hausdorff; for any distinct p, q ∈ M , one can find disjoint open sets O p and O q containing p and q respectively. We say two spacetimes (M, g ab ) and (M , g ab ) are isometric if there is a diffeomorphism ϕ : M → M such that ϕ * (g ab ) = g ab .
For each point p ∈ M , the metric assigns a cone structure to the tangent space M p . Any tangent vector ξ a in M p will be timelike if g ab ξ a ξ b > 0, null if g ab ξ a ξ b = 0, or spacelike if g ab ξ a ξ b < 0. Null vectors create the "cone structure; timelike vectors are inside the cone while spacelike vectors are outside. A time orientable spacetime is one that has a continuous timelike vector field on M . A time orientable spacetime allows one to distinguish between the future and past lobes of the light cone. In what follows, it is assumed that spacetimes are time orientable.
For some open (connected) interval I ⊆ R, a smooth curve γ : I → M is timelike if the tangent vector ξ a at each point in γ[I] is timelike. Similarly, a curve is null (respectively, spacelike) if its tangent vector at each point is null (respectively, spacelike). A curve is causal if its tangent vector at each point is either null or timelike. A causal curve is future-directed if its tangent vector at each point falls in or on the future lobe of the light cone.
We say a curve γ : I → M is not maximal if there is another curve γ : I → M such that I is a proper subset of I and γ(s) = γ (s) for all s ∈ I. A curve γ :
where ξ a is the tangent vector and ∇ a is the unique derivative operator compatible with g ab .
For any two points p, q ∈ M , we write p << q if there exists a futuredirected timelike curve from p to q. We write p < q if there exists a futuredirected causal curve from p to q. These relations allow us to define the timelike and causal pasts and futures of a point p: I − (p) = {q : q << p}, I + (p) = {q : p << q}, J − (p) = {q : q < p}, and J + (p) = {q : p < q}. Naturally, for any set S ⊆ M , define J + [S] to be the set ∪{J + (x) : x ∈ S} and so on.
A point p ∈ M is a future endpoint of a future-directed causal curve γ : I → M if, for every neighborhood O of p, there exists a point t 0 ∈ I such that γ(t) ∈ O for all t > t 0 . A past endpoint is defined similarly. A causal curve is future inextendible (respectively, past inextendible) if it has no future (respectively, past) endpoint.
For any set S ⊆ M , we define the past domain of dependence of S, written D − (S), to be the set of points p ∈ M such that every causal curve with past endpoint p and no future endpoint intersects S. The future domain of dependence of S, written D + (S), is defined analogously. The entire domain of dependence of S, written D(S), is just the set D − (S) ∪ D + (S). The edge of an achronal set S ⊂ M is the collection of points p ∈ S such that every open neighborhood O of p contains a point q ∈ I + (p), a point r ∈ I − (p), and a timelike curve from r to q which does not intersect S. A set S ⊂ M is a slice if it is closed, achronal, and without edge. A spacetime (M, g ab ) which contains a slice S such that D(S) = M is said to be globally hyperbolic.
A Condition to Disallow Holes?
Consider the following example. Example 1. Let (M, g ab ) be Minkowski spacetime and let p be any point in M . Consider the spacetime (M − {p}, g ab ).
The spacetime seems to have an artificial "hole" (see Figure 1) . One seeks to find a (simple, physically meaningful) condition to disallow the example. (The condition need not be a sufficient condition for "physical reasonableness"; it need only be necessary.) But "although one perhaps has a good intuitive idea of what it is that one wants to avoid, it seems to be difficult to formulate a precise condition to rule out such examples" (Geroch and Horowitz 1979, 275). Many of the conditions used to rule out the "hole" in example 1 require that certain regions of (or curves in) spacetime be "as large as they can be". For example, geodesic completeness requires every geodesic to be as large as it can be in a certain sense. Hole-freeness essentially requires the domain of dependence of every spacelike surface to be as large as it can be. Inextendibility requires the entirety of spacetime to be as large as it can be. Let us examine each of these three conditions in more detail. First, consider geodesic completeness.
Definition. A spacetime (M, g ab ) is geodesically complete if every maximal geodesic γ : I → M is such that I = R. A spacetime is geodesically incomplete if it is not geodesically complete.
If an incomplete geodesic is timelike or null, there is a useful distinction one can introduce (which we will need later). We say that a future-directed timelike or null geodesic γ : I → M without future endpoint is future incomplete if there is an r ∈ R such that s < r for all s ∈ I. A past incomplete timelike or null geodesic is defined analogously. Next, consider inextendibility.
Definition A spacetime (M, g ab ) is extendible if there exists a spacetime (M , g ab ) and an isometric embedding ϕ :
Here, the spacetime (M , g ab ) is an extension of (M, g ab ). A spacetime is inextendible if has no extension.
Finally, consider hole-freeness. Initially, one defined (Geroch 1977 ) a spacetime (M, g ab ) to be hole-free if, for every spacelike surface S ⊂ M and every isometric embedding ϕ : D(S) → M into some other spacetime (M , g ab ), we have ϕ(D(S)) = D(ϕ(S)). The definition seemed to be satisfactory. But surprisingly, it turns out the definition is too strong; Minkowski spacetime fails to be hole-free under this formulation (Krasnikov 2009 ). But one can make modifications to avoid this consequence (Manchak 2009 ).
Let (K, g ab ) be a globally hyperbolic spacetime. Let ϕ : K → K be an isometric embedding into a spacetime (K , g ab ). We say (K , g ab ) is an effective extension of (K, g ab ) if, for some Cauchy surface S in (K, g ab ),
is achronal. Hole-freeness can then be defined as follows.
Definition. A spacetime (M, g ab ) is hole-free if, for every set K ⊆ M such that (K, g ab|K ) is a globally hyperbolic spacetime with Cauchy surface S, if (K , g ab|K ) is not an effective extension of (K, g ab|K ) where K = int(D(S)), then there is no effective extension of (K, g ab|K ).
What is the relationship between the three conditions? There are only two implication relations between them (see Manchak 2014 for all proofs and counterexamples).
Proposition. Any spacetime which is geodesically complete is (i) hole-free and (ii) inextendible. Now, any of the three conditions can be used to rule out the "hole" in example 1. But due to the singularity theorems (Hawking and Penrose 1970 
The spacetime in example 2 is geodesically complete. It is therefore inextendible and hole-free. Nonetheless, it seems there is still an artificial "hole" in the spacetime. One seeks a (simple, physically meaningful) condition to rule out even these holes.
A New Condition
Consider the following definition.
Definition. A spacetime (M, g ab ) has an epistemic hole if there is a point p ∈ M and two future-inextedible timelike curves γ and γ through p such that
The physical significance of the definition is this: Suppose you and I are both present at some event. Now suppose you go your way and I go mine. If it is the case that I can eventually know everything you can eventually know and more, then there is a kind of epistemic "hole" preventing you from knowing the extra bit. One might require the region of spacetime which an observer can eventually know to be "as large as it can be". In other words, one might require spacetime to be free from epistemic holes.
Is the definition adequate? Examples 1 and 2 have epistemic holes as we would expect. But, unfortunately, the condition is too strong; it rules Despite the relaxed formulation, examples 1 and 2 still count as having epistemic holes (see Figure 3) . Moreover, a number of spacetimes thought to be physically reasonable are epistemically hole-free (e.g. Minkowski spacetime). The condition of epistemic hole-freeness is somewhat permissive in that it does not automatically rule out acausal spacetimes (e.g. Gödel spacetime).
On the other hand, some spacetimes with "naked singularities" have epistemic holes (e.g. Misner spacetime). But spacetimes with naked singularities Definition. A spacetime (M, g ab ) has a naked singularity if there is a point p ∈ M and a future-incomplete timelike geodesic γ such that
What is the relationship between naked singularities and epistemic holes? Example 2 shows that naked singularities are not equivalent to epistemic holes (the example contains no naked singularities). And the following example contains naked singularities but no epistemic holes.
Example 3. Let (M, g ab ) be two dimensional Minkowski spacetime in standard t, x coordinates which is "rolled up" along the t direction. Let p be any point in M . Consider the spacetime (M − {p}, g ab ).
Now, the condition of global hyperbolicity is sufficient to exclude naked singularities (Geroch and Horowitz 1979) . In addition, global hyperbolicity together with inextendibility requires spacetime to be hole-free (Manchak 2009 ). And, despite the fact that the global hyperbolicity is a strong causal condition, some hold that it is satisfied by all physically reasonable spacetimes (Penrose 1979) . Might it be the case that global hyperbolicity rules out epistemic holes? Consider the following. Example 4 shows that a globally hyperbolic spacetime, indeed even a globally hyperbolic spacetime which is geodesically complete, can nonetheless have epistemic holes. On the other hand, example 3 shows that a spacetime which is non-globally hyperbolic, indeed even a non-globally hyperbolic spacetime which fails to be inextendible and hole-free, can nonetheless be epistemically hole-free. In sum: epistemic holes are very different from "holes" and "singularities" of various kinds.
A New Type of Condition
Stepping back, we note that the definition of epstemic hole-freeness differs from (and indeed is more attractive than) inextendibility and hole-freeness in two important ways.
First, inextendibility and hole-freeness require that certain regions of spacetime be "as large as they can be" in the sense that one compares them, from a God's eye point of view, to similar regions in all possible spacetimes. And without knowing in advance which of all possible spacetimes are phys-ically reasonable (and how could one know?) such a comparison is on unsteady ground. But consider epistemic hole-freeness. The condition requires that certain regions of spacetime be "as large as they can be" in the sense that one compares them to similar regions within the very same spacetime. Thus, we have one way in which the proposed condition is a bit easier to swallow (and pragmatically easier to work with).
Second, there is a sense in which, if inextendibility or hole-freeness are satisfied or violated in a spacetime, observers in the spacetime may not have the epistemic resources to know it. But this is not the case for epistemic holes. Consider the following definition (Glymour 1977) .
Definition. Two space-times (M, g ab ) and (M , g ab ) are observationally indistinguishable if for every future-inextendible timelike curve γ in (M, g ab ), there is a future-inextendible timelike curve γ in (M , g ab ) such that I − [γ] and I − [γ ] are isometric; and, correspondingly, with the roles of (M, g ab ) and (M , g ab ) interchanged.
Let us say that a spacetime property is preserved under observational indistinguishability if, for every pair of observationally indistinguishable spacetimes, one has the property just in case the other does as well. We have the following.
Proposition. Epistemic hole-freeness is preserved under observational indistinguishability. Inextendibility and hole-freeness are not.
Proof. Let (M, g ab ) and (M , g ab ) be observationally indistinguishable spacetimes. Suppose (M, g ab ) has an epistemic hole. So, there is a point p ∈ M and two future-inextedible timelike geodesics γ and γ through p such that I Next, consider hole-freeness. Let (M, g ab ) be two dimensional Minkowski spacetime in standard t, x coordinates with the set {(t, x) : t ≥ 0} removed from the manifold. Let p be any point in M and let M be the manifold I − (p). One can verify that (M, g ab ) and (M , g ab ) are observationally indistinguishable. But (M, g ab ) is not hole-free and (M , g ab ) is. So hole-freeness is not preserved under observational indistinguishability (see Figure 5) .
For the inextendibility case, see Malament (1977, 78 ). The proposition shows another sense in which epistemic hole-freeness is more appropriate to presuppose than hole-freeness or inextendibility. If it seems to an observer that her spacetime is hole-free and inextendible, this gives little reason to be confident that the spacetime actually satisfies the conditions. In fact, confidence in the satisfaction of these two conditions comes primarily from metaphysical principles involving plenitude and causal determinism (Earman 1995 , Manchak 2011 ). This should give us pause. On the other hand, if it seems to an observer that her spacetime is epistemically hole-free, this does give some reason to be confident that the spacetime actually satisfies the condition.
